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1 Introduction
The literature on economic voting notes that voters’ subjective evaluations of the overall
state of the economy are correlated with vote choice, whereas personal economic experiences
are not (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979, 1981). Missing from this literature is a description of how
voters acquire information about the general state of the economy, and how that information
is used to form perceptions. In order to begin understanding this process, we asked a series
of questions on the 2006 ANES Pilot about respondents’ perceptions of the average price
of gas and the unemployment rate in their home state. In this chapter we analyze both
the determinents and political consequences of respondents’ percpetions of these economic
variables.
We find that questions about gas prices and unemployment show differences in the sources
of information about these two economic variables. Information about unemployment rates
come from media sources, and are systematically biased by partisan factors. Information
about gas prices, in contrast, comes only from everyday experiences. While information
about both indicators show effects from demographics, only unemployment rates affect a
respondent’s political outlook. Moreover, perceptions of unemployment rates can be used to
isolate the effect of economics on partisan preferences.
2 ANES Survey Questions
Our contribution is based on questions we proposed for the 2006 ANES Pilot which asked
about quantitative measures of economic performance, specifically gas prices and unemploy-
ment. These questions appeared as follows where R is shorthand for respondent.
As far as you know, what is the current unemployment rate in [R’s state] - that is of the
adults in [STATE] who wanted to work during the second week of [MONTH], what percent
of them would you guess were unemployed and looking for a job?
If R responds “I don’t know”: What would be your best guess?
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During a typical week, how many days do you drive an automobile?
During a typical week, how many times do you notice the price of gasoline in your area?
What is your best guess of the average price of a gallon of regular unleaded gasoline across
all of [STATE] today?
If R responds “I don’t know”: What would be your best guess?
In the analysis that follows we also used questions Mod18 1, Mod18 3, Mod18 5, Mod18 7,
Mod27 1, Mod27 5, Mod27 9 and Mod2 13. The wording of these questions can be found
in the appendix. Note that the questions from Module 18 focused on the media, and that
the results of these questions are analyzed in depth in XXX.
3 Knowledge about the State of the Economy
At the aggregate level, economic performance is an important prediction of candidate vote
share.1 Survey based studies of economic voting find seemingly contradictory results; voters’
perceptions of the overall state of the economy influence vote choice, but personal economic
experience does not. Moreover, the state of the economy has a relatively modest effect on
vote choice (Fiorina, 1978, 1981). The theory of sociotropic (rather than egotistical) voting
seeks to explain these results by positing that voters care about social utility rather than
their personal utility (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979, 1981). Meanwhile, attempts at reconcil-
ing ecological and survey-based findings have largely focused on looking for errors in the
statistical methodologies in one or the other type of study. (e.g. Kramer (1983); Ander-
sen and Evans (2006); Lewis-Beck (2006)). Notably absent from these reconciliations is an
explanation of where voters get information about the overall state of the economy.
We propose instead that these findings may arise from 1) failing to take account of the
media’s role in providing information about objective facts, 2) differences in the nature
of statistics used to predict vote choice and vote share (i.e. subjective assessments versus
objective economic statistics), and 3) measurement error created by respondents answering
1See Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000) for an overview. Important early work on this subject can be
found in Kramer (1971), Fair (1978, 1996) and Tufte (1975, 1978).
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survey questions through a partisan lens. We take these arguments in turn.
If a voter’s evaluation of the overall state of the economy does not include their personal
economic experience, where does their information about the economy come from? Potential
sources include their family, friends and neighbors, and the media. We focus on the later
because of the well-developed literature on the media. Our questions are designed to elicit a
respondent’s actual knowledge of economic conditions, and relate this knowledge of economic
conditions to their level of media exposure, their actual economic experience, and their
subjective assessment of economic questions.
We focus on respondents’ knowledge about unemployment rates and gas prices for two
substantive reasons. The first is that these factors vary in how much knowledge can be gained
through personal experience. Perceptions of gas prices will primarily depend upon the prices
at the pump during respondents’ recent refills. In contrast, perceptions of unemployment
rates are likely affected both by the media and whether a respondent’s friends or family are
currently or recently unemployed. Second, these issues are important factors in political
campaigns and have high media salience. In particular, energy prices have particular policy
importance not just because of their economic importance, but also due to the underlying
security issues evinced by high energy prices.
Our second proposition notes that studies of vote share rely on objective economic statis-
tics, while studies of vote choice rely on voters’ subjective assessment of the state of the econ-
omy.2,3 As pointed out by Anderson, Duch and Palmer (2000) voters’ answers on subjective
questions about the economy depend on their partisan preferences and level of attentiveness.
Moreover, these biases in perception may cause aggregation bias when looking across voters
for the effect of economic performance on vote choice.
Partisan differences in subjective evaluations of the economy could arise from different
2Conover, Feldman and Knight (1986, 1987) are exceptions as they use individuals’ perceptions of ob-
jective economic data. However, they examine only the overall accuracy of perceptions, and how these
perceptions shape estimates of future economic trends.
3By subjective we mean that they ask the respondent to qualify how they perceive the state of the U.S.
economy, often as it relates to previous performance, rather than asking about objective economic statistics,
as we propose. For examples of subjective questions see ANES questions 900422 and 923531.
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perceptions of the actual level of economic indicators. Possible explanations for variation in
these perceptions include self-serving bias (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005), an exaggera-
tion of the performance of the economy in a way that is consistent with a voter’s partisan
preferences (Zaller, 1992), and information differences. Another potential explanation is that
the subjective threshold by which economic improvement is measured is influenced by char-
acteristics of respondents like partisan leanings; a Democrat may be more likely to respond
that the economy is ”doing worse” when a Republican is president. By asking questions
about the specific level of various economic indicators scholars will be able to untangle these
two channels and identify the overall impact of economic performance on vote choice.
4 Asking About Unemployment
The 2006 ANES Pilot asked respondents to give their assessment of the unemployment level
in their state. Although it would require multiple observations from the same respondent
to answer many of the above questions, we can draw some interesting conclusions from
the cross-sectional results. We can use a state’s actual unemployment rate in November
to calculate the difference between the respondent’s perception and actual unemployment.4
Figure 1 shows a kernel density plot of this difference broken down by partisan affiliation.
Overall, respondents’ perceptions of the unemployment rate are much higher than the
actual unemployment rate. Democrats’ responses were higher than those of Republicans
or independents. While this is consistent with viewing the state of the economy through
a partisan lens, we cannot distinguish this from Democrats perceiving that the economy is
worse because of personal experience.
We would like to know to what extent the error in a respondent’s perception is due to
demographic and partisan factors, as well as media exposure. Table 1 answers some of these
questions. For the analyses that follow, we use the standard seven point party identification
4Unemployment figures are from http://www.bls.gov/web/lauhsthl.htm
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scale to classify each respondent as a Democrat, Republican or Independent.5
Table 1 confirms that Democrats are more likely to think that the unemployment rate is
high, even when controlling for numerous other factors. The table also indicates that individ-
ual characteristics that are correlated with likelihood of unemployment are also significantly
related to unemployment perceptions. Black respondents had overwhelmingly higher percep-
tions of the unemployment rate. Given that the unemployment rate for blacks (8.6 percent)
was more than double than that of whites (3.9 percent) in November 2006, this suggests
that individuals may be drawing from personal experiences when reporting unemployment
perceptions. Consistent with this pattern, females had significantly higher perceptions of
unemployment.6 Similarly, college graduates are less likely to be unemployed and have lower
perceptions of unemployment.
Media is also an important predictor of respondent accuracy. Individuals who reported
listening to news on the radio had lower unemployment perceptions. Conversely, individuals
watching television news had higher perceptions of unemployment.7 Additionally, respon-
dent’s answers do not depend on the party of the governor, nor on whether the state legisla-
ture and executive are all in the hands of the same party or not. This last fact extends the
finding in Snowberg, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2007) that divided government has little effect
on economic expectations to the state level.
A question we cannot answer in the cross-section is how campaigns and the media affect
the magnitude of the partisan difference in perception of objective facts like unemployment
and the number of troops killed in Iraq. It may be that campaigns increase knowledge of
objective facts, reducing the reliance on partisan biases, and subsequently reducing partisan
differences. In contrast, campaigns may increase partisanship, thereby increasing partisan
5To construct partisan identification we used the Party ID scale and coded 6 and 7 as Republican, 3-5 as
independent, and 1-2 as Democrat.
6While in official unemployment figures men and women have similar unemployment rates, this does not
account for the fact that the labor force participation rate of women is much lower.
7The radio variable is nearly statistically significant in the 50th and 75th percentile regressions (p = 0.11
and p = 0.15 respectively). Entering these coefficients one-by-one produces the same results, eliminating
concerns of multi-collinearity between the media variables.
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differences in the reporting of objective facts. Whichever effect exists, it is likely to be
particularly prominent in a long Presidential campaign where there will be plenty of chances
for candidates and the media to try to inform voters.8
5 Using Unemployment Responses to Eliminate The
Partisan Lens
In addition to informing scholars about differences in individuals’ perceptions of the economy,
factual questions can also be valuable for analyzing retrospective voting questions. Numerous
studies have looked at the relationship between individual’s retrospective evaluations of the
economy and vote choice. Generally these studies test how vote choice relates with answers to
questions such as “Would you say that over the past year the nation’s economy has gotten
better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse?” One problem with such a question is
that it confounds differences in economic perceptions with the lens through which economic
performance is judged. For example, the same person who responded that the nation’s
economy has stayed about the same in 2006 may have instead answered that the economy
got better had a Democrat been president.
The first row of Table 2 examines how individuals’ retrospective assessments of the econ-
omy relate with their assessment of George W. Bush’s overall performance and his perfor-
mance in three particular policy areas: the economy, foreign affairs, and the war on terror. It
shows that individuals’ retrospective evaluations of the economy are statistically significantly
related to evaluations of the president in all of these domains.
The second row of Table 2 examines how individuals’ perceptions of unemployment relate
to their assessment of George W. Bush’s overall performance and his performance in the same
three policy areas.9 Note that this variable is only related to respondent’s assessment of the
8Stevenson and Vavreck (2000) find that economic performance is a more important determinant of vote
choice the longer the political campaign.
9We top-code the unemployment rate at 30%. Results are similar if we choose 20% or 25% as our
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economy. This implies that we can use responses the unemployment question to isolate the
part of a respondent’s retrospective evaluation that is actually driven by the economy from
the part that is driven by the lens through which respondents’ judge economic performance.
In Table 3, we use perceptions of unemployment as an instrument for retrospective eco-
nomic assessments. By rooting retrospective evaluations of the economy in objective percep-
tions, we isolate variation in economic evaluations rooted in differences in actual economic
perceptions. The first column indicates that our first stage correlation is large, validating
the use of actual perceptions as an instrument. The second column indicates economic per-
ceptions continue to affect respondent’s evaluations of Bush’s performance on the economy.
The third and fourth and fifth columns show that the part of the retrospective evaluation
that is driven by actual economic perceptions is not related to the respondents’ assessment
of Bush’s overall performance or his handling of other issues.
6 Asking About Gas Prices
The 2006 ANES Pilot also asked respondents to give their assessment of the average price of
gas in their home state. Unlike with the unemployment rate, Figure 2 shows that there are
no discernable partisan differences in the perception of gas prices. Moreover, the population
is on the whole well calibrated to actual gas prices, with responses distributed symmetrically
around the true value.
However, Figure 2 may obscure some important differences. It may be that certain groups
of respondents (by race, age, gender, or education level) all give biased answers; they are
systematically above or below the correct amount. Some groups may also be inprecise; they
are in aggregate accurate, but have a large dispersion around the true answer. The correlates
of bias and imprecision in the population is largely unknown. For example, Ansolabehere,
Snowberg and Snyder (2005) found that, perhaps counter-intuitively, higher education at-
threshold for top-coding. Results are generally similar if the threshold is above 30%, however, the results
become sensitive to the choice of threshold as outliers drive more and more of the variation.
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tainment was inversely correlated with the accuracy of information about campaign finance.
Table 4 shows that a respondent’s perception of gas prices is influenced by demographic
characteristics. Taken together, the first and second columns show that no group is accurate
in their assessment of gas prices, however, blacks and Hispanics make significantly less precise
predictions. The table also shows that it is possible to ask questions to control for lifestyle
factors that might make a respondent’s perception of gas prices more precise. The number
of times that the respondent drives and notices gas prices each week are both highly corre-
lated with the precision of the respondent’s prediction, whether these controls are entered
separately or jointly (as in the table). Notably absent from the results are any effect of the
media on gas price perceptions. This is perhaps intuitive as information about gas prices is
readily available from everyday experience, whereas information about unemployment rates
is not.
Finally, we examine how perceptions of economic variables might affect partisan leanings.
Table 5 examines the effects of both gas prices and unemployment perceptions on changes
in party identification between 2004 and 2006. The regressions include dummies for a re-
spondent’s initial party ID to control for the fact that an initially extreme party ID allows
movement in only one direction towards the center.10 The effects of unemployment on party
ID are unequivocal: higher perceptions of unemployment are associated with shifts to the
left, away from a Republican ID. Although this drift is somewhat smaller among respondents
who initially identified as Republicans, the effect holds across the political spectrum. This
is true even if we control for other measures of approval of the president and retrospective
economic evaluations.
Interestingly, there is no effect of gas prices on party ID. This seems to contradict the
conventional wisdom that energy prices are an important political factor. However, what
may be politically important are changes in perceptions of gas prices, rather than the level of
perception. Since gas prices tend to be lower in November than during the summer, it may
10This might be thought of as a regression to the mean or censoring problem.
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be that elections (and election studies) are conducted at the wrong time for this issue to be
salient. Moreover, gas prices were particularly high during this period. This may have made
respondents unusually aware of gas prices masking variations in perceptions that might be
present during times when gas prices are lower.
7 Conclusion
This summary outlines several findings from questions about objective economic numbers on
the 2006 ANES Pilot. These findings are preliminary, and we hope that a broader adoption of
such economic questions will allow the research community to better understand phenomena
such as economic voting.
We conclude by posing some research questions that we were not able to address using
just this one survey. How do different groups acquire and process economic information?
For example, why do blacks and women perceive a higher unemployment rate than whites
and men? Is it due to respondent’s personal experiences or those of their peer groups? The
underlying correlates of accuracy and precision can inform researchers about this question.
Accuracy and precision cannot be measured using subjective questions since, by definition,
subjective questions have no correct answer.
How does voter information change with the statistical bias of local and national media?
We have reason to believe that there will be such an effect as Hetherington (1996) has
found that increased media usage leads to more negative perceptions of the economy. Since
statistical bias deals with the reporting of numbers, it is easier to measure and correlate
with survey responses than traditional notions of media bias (Ansolabehere, Snowberg and
Snyder, 2005).
Finally, by adding these questions to the standard ANES time-series study, researchers
will be able to examine how the accuracy and consistency of perceptions about economic
aggregates map into subjective evaluations of the economy and vote choice. For example, it
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may be that when a group gives inconsistent measures of economic statistics, it may be that
those who suggested a number above a certain threshold will be markedly more likely to
suggest that the economy is doing well, or to vote for a particular candidate. By continuing
to use these questions scholars will be able to examine this question, and to eliminate a
large amount of measurement error from respondent’s subjective and objective evaluations
(Ansolabehere, Rodden and Snyder, 2006).
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Figure 1: Respondent’s estimates of unemployment levels show partisan bias.
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Figure 2: Respondent’s estimates of gas prices do not show partisan bias.
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Figures and Tables–1
Table 1: Quantile Regressions: Dep. Var. is Reported State Unemployment Rate — State
Unemployment Rate in 11/2006
Percentile : 25% 50% 75%
Independent (Party ID = 3, 4, 5) -0.696 0.313 -1.10
(.616) (.924) (2.34)
Republican (Party ID = 6, 7) -1.49∗∗ -1.90∗∗ -4.21∗
(.601) (.891) (2.21)
TV News—Days per Week 1.43∗ 3.63∗∗∗ 5.55∗
(.840) (1.23) (3.04)
Radio News—Days per Week -0.585 -1.54 -3.47
(.651) (.956) (2.39)
Newspaper—Days per Week -0.097 -0.131 0.166
(.664) (1.00) (2.56)
Internet—Days per Week -0.443 -0.076 -2.51
(.622) (.957) (2.45)
Democratic Governor -0.439 -0.997 1.07
(.494) (.745) (1.87)
United Government (State) -0.664 0.528 1.05
(.517) (.772) (1.92)
Age -0.090 -0.203 -0.829∗∗∗
(.092) (.133) (.318)
Age Squared 0.004 0.001 0.008∗∗∗
(.001) (.001) (.003)
Male -1.01∗∗ -4.84∗∗∗ -11.4∗∗∗
(.507) (.763) (1.92)
Black 8.83∗∗∗ 16.5∗∗∗ 22.7∗∗∗
(.864) (1.25) (3.13)
Hispanic -0.738 -1.14 -2.85
(1.20) (1.87) (4.53)
College Graduate -1.30∗∗ -3.84∗∗∗ -8.25∗∗∗
(.536) (.771) (1.90)
Union Member -0.357 -0.345 3.01
(.618) (.920) (2.23)
Constant 6.17∗∗∗ 15.1∗∗∗ 44.6∗∗∗
(2.19) (3.22) (7.71)
Pseudo R2 0.048 0.120 0.202
n 643 643 643
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Figures and Tables–2
Table 2: Correlates of Bush Approval Linear Regression Does [respondent] approve or
disapprove of Bush handling of ? (1 = Approves, 0 = Neither Approve/Disapprove, -1
= Disapprove)
Dependent Variable:
Foreign
Economy Overall Terror Relations
Retrospective Economic Evaluation 0.384∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗
(1=Better, 0=Same, -1=Worse) (.042) (.039) (.045) (.044)
Reported Unemployment Rate -0.007∗∗ 0.004 0.005 -0.006
(.003) (.003) (.004) (.004)
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level with standard
errors in parenthesis. Each cell is a different regression that also contains: state and party
fixed effects, age, age squared, race, ethnicity, gender, education and whether or not the
respondent is a union member. n = 641− 659.
Figures and Tables–3
Table 3: Correlates of Bush Approval IV Regression Does [respondent] approve or disap-
prove of Bush handling of ? (1 = Approves, 0 = Neither Approve/Disapprove, -1 =
Disapprove)
Dependent Variable:
First Stage Second Stage
Retrospective Foreign
Econ. Eval. Economy Overall Terror Relations
Reported Unemployment Rate -0.008∗∗∗
(.003)
Retrospective Economic Evaluation 0.850∗∗ -0.454 -0.555 0.020
(1=Better, 0=Same, -1=Worse) (.431) (.450) (0.520) (.414)
Independent (Party ID = 3, 4, 5) 0.129∗ 0.291∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗
(.074) (.102) (.104) (.124) (.414)
Republican (Party ID = 6, 7) 0.558∗∗∗ 0.653 1.41∗∗∗ 1.47∗∗∗ 0.990∗∗∗
(.070) (.262) (.272) (.316) (.254)
Age -0.019∗ 0.013 0.012 0.001 0.001
(.010) (.014) (.014) (.017) (.013)
Age Squared 0.0002∗ -0.0001 -0.0001 0.000 0.000
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.000) (.000)
Male 0.272∗∗∗ -0.140 0.161 0.409∗∗ 0.017
(.060) (.150) (.157) (.181) (.144)
Black -0.222∗∗ 0.129 -0.194 -0.286 -0.156
(.106) (.169) (.179) (.204) (.166)
Hispanic -0.025 -0.143 0.089 -0.121 -0.221
(.155) (.177) (.184) (.214) (.173)
College Graduate 0.093 -0.094 -0.026 0.025 -0.123
(.063) (.103) (.094) (.108) (.087)
Union Member -0.121 -0.072 -0.145 -0.139 -0.025
(.076) (.103) (.107) (.125) (.101)
Constant 0.226 -0.202 -1.82∗∗ -0.809 -0.990
(.262) (.933) (.756) (.881) (.711)
R2 0.246 0.320 0.153 0.052 0.301
n 640 640 642 641 641
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level with standard errors in parenthesis.
Each regression that also contains state fixed effects
Figures and Tables–4
Table 4: Bias and Accuracy of Respondent’s Perceptions of Gas Prices
Dependent Variable:
Reported—Actual | Reported—Actual |
Gas Prices Gas Prices
Independent (Party ID = 3, 4, 5) 0.002 -0.012
(.031) (.024)
Republican (Party ID = 6, 7) 0.014 0.005
(.030) (.024)
Drive— -0.025∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
Number of Times per week (.006) (.005)
Notice Gas Prices -0.004 -0.009∗∗∗
Number of Times per week (.003) (.003)
TV News—Days per Week 0.0003 -0.035
(.041) (.033)
Radio News—Days per Week 0.020 0.029
(.032) (.026)
Newspaper—Days per Week 0.055 0.012
(.624) (.027)
Internet—Days per Week -0.008 0.025
(.032) (.025)
Age 0.008∗ -0.0004
(.004) (.004)
Age Squared -0.0001∗∗∗ 0.000
(.00004) (.000)
Male 0.001 -0.027
(.025) (.021)
Black 0.026 0.175∗∗∗
(.041) (.033)
Hispanic 0.041 0.157∗∗∗
(.062) (.050)
College Graduate -0.043 -0.009
(.026) (.020)
Union Member -0.021 -0.014
(.[31) (.024)
Constant 0.066 0.351
(.108) (.086)
R2 0.057 0.112
n 662 662
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Standard errors
in parenthesis.
Figures and Tables–5
Table 5: Correlates of Changes in Party Identifictaion
Dependent Variable:
∆Party ID =
Party ID 2006 − Party ID 2004
Gas Price Perception 0.080 0.090 0.077 0.087
(.178) (.176) (.172) (.172)
Unemployment Perception -0.016∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗
(.005) (.006) (.006) (.007)
Bush Approval 0.550∗∗∗ 0.555∗∗∗
(1 = Approve, 0 = Neither, -1 = Disapprove) (.075) (.075)
Retrospective Economic Evaluation 0.166∗∗ 0.150∗∗
(1=Better, 0=Same, -1=Worse) (.074) (.074)
Reported Unemployment Rate × 0.027∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
2004 Party ID = 1 or 2 (.011) (.010)
Age -0.006 -0.006
(.018) (.018)
Age Squared 0.000 0.000
(.000) (.000)
Male 0.061 0.052
(.109) (.108)
Black -0.037 -0.092
(.193) (.192)
Hispanic -0.011 0.025
(.275) (.274)
College Graduate 0.054 0.050
(.111) (.110)
Union Member 0.056 0.059
(.136) (.135)
Constant -0.818 -0.935 -1.48 -1.21
(1.38) (1.37) (1.38) (1.38)
R2 0.100 0.110 0.200 0.209
n 632 632 629 629
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level with standard errors in
parenthesis. Each column is a linear regression that includes fixed effects for state and for 2004 Party
ID.
Figures and Tables–6
